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Abstract
In this paper, it is shown that real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria generically arises
in most matching models with perfectly divisible media of exchange. In other words, the real
indeterminacy follows from the condition for stationarity of holdings of media of exchange. More-
over, we present a new technique to prove the existence of stationary equilibria; especially, it is
applicable to the case that both money and goods are perfectly divisible.
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1 Introduction
Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found in matching models
with ﬁat money. (See, for example, Green and Zhou [6] [7], Matsui and Shimizu [15],
and Zhou [21].1) In this paper, it is shown that real indeterminacy generically arises
in most matching models with perfectly divisible media of exchange. In other words,
the real indeterminacy follows from the condition for stationarity of holdings of media
of exchange, and surprisingly it has nothing to do with the other speciﬁcations of the
models. Moreover, we present a new technique to prove the existence of stationary
equilibria applicable to a wide class of matching models.
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1Green and Zhou [7] have found real indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria from an initial state as well.
1It is well known that some general equilibrium models have intrinsic multiplicity of
equilibria. (See, for example, Gale [4], Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell [5], Herings [9],
Samuelson [16], and van der Laan [20].) Overlapping generations models, for example,
have such real indeterminacy of equilibria; in the so-called Samuelson’s case, there is a
continuum of equilibria parameterized by the ﬁrst period consumption. Nevertheless,
stationary equilibria are typically determinate in intertemporal general equilibrium
models; for example, overlapping generations models have generically a ﬁnite number
of stationary equilibria. (See Kehoe and Levine [14].)
However, it is recently shown that even stationary equilibria are indeterminate in
a few matching models with divisible money referred above. Though some authors
intuitively argued that speciﬁc bargaining procedures lead to the intrinsic multiplicity
of equilibria, the logic behind the real indeterminacy has not been found so far. In this
paper, it is shown that the real indeterminacy results from the condition for stationarity
of holdings of media of exchange, independently of the details of the models.
A sketch of our idea is as follows. Suppose the nominal stock of money is given.
When the price level is low, there is a lot of liquidity in the economy, the trade is
frequent, and therefore the welfare level is high. When the price level is high, there is
less liquidity in the economy, the trade is less frequent, and therefore the welfare level is
low. If we can ﬁnd the corresponding equilibrium values of the other variables, such as
the money holdings distribution and the value function, as the price level continuously
varies, then the real indeterminacy follows. If the number of variables is larger than
that of equations, then by applying the implicit function theorem this property holds.
In this paper, we show that the stationary condition of money holdings, common to all
random matching models of media of exchange, has at least one more variable than the
number of equations. Thus the stationary equilibria in such models are indeterminate.
More speciﬁcally, we consider the case of one medium of exchange. Suppose it
is perfectly divisible and there is an upper bound of its holdings. We conﬁne our
attention to stationary equilibria in which, for some positive number p, all trades
occur with its integer multiple amounts of the medium of exchange. Also, we focus on
stationary distributions on {0,...,N} expressed by h =( h(0),...,h(N)), where h(n)
is the measure of the set of agents with np amount of the medium of exchange, and
N<∞ is the upper bound. In the condition for stationarity of holdings of the medium




n=0 In always holds, where On (In) is the outﬂow (inﬂow resp.) at n, then,
2at ﬁrst glance, there seem to be (N +1) independent equations, On = In, n =1 ,...,N,
and
 N
n=0h(n) = 1. Thus it seems that the numbers of independent equations and
variables, h(n),n=0 ,...,N, are the same. However, surprisingly it can be shown that
one more equation is always redundant and that the system of equations has always at




n=1nIn always holds. This fact is
the key to the real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria.
We present the concept of a stationary quasi-equilibrium which is weaker than a
stationary equilibrium. It enables us to analyze matching models in a general way.
Note that, in most of the speciﬁc models, it can easily be shown that a stationary quasi-
equilibrium is indeed a stationary equilibrium. Let V =( V (0),...,V(N)) and β be a
value function and a proportion of actions, respectively, and (V ∗,h ∗,β∗) be a stationary
quasi-equilibrium. Then, due to the indeterminacy of stationary distributions, it seems
that there exists another stationary quasi-equilibrium (V,h,β) in a small neighborhood
of (V ∗,h ∗,β∗). Indeed, using diﬀerential topology, we can show that the existence of a
stationary quasi-equilibrium generically leads to the existence of a continuum of them.
It can also be shown that real allocations are generically not constant in a connected
set of the stationary quasi-equilibria.
We also present a suﬃcient condition that the indeterminacy of stationary quasi-
equilibria implies that of stationary equilibria. That is any model satisfying this con-
dition has a continuum of stationary equilibria as well as a continuum of stationary
quasi-equilibria. In some matching models with indivisible money, such as Camera
and Corbae [3], Shi [17], and Trejos and Wright [19], the stationary equilibria are de-
terminate. However, if once they are extended to the models with perfectly divisible
money, then real indeterminacy generically arises. Indeed, these models satisfy the
suﬃcient condition. Moreover, we directly show that the Camera and Corbae’s model
with divisible money has real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria.
Even if we maintain the assumption of indivisible money, the above arguments
suggest that the greater the divisibility of the medium of exchange, the larger the
number of equilibria. In other words, for a ﬁxed money supply and a ﬁxed upper
bound of money holdings, there are much larger number of equilibria in the case of one
unit of money being one cent than in the case of one hundred dollars.
By using the results we showed on indeterminacy, we present a new technique to
prove the existence of stationary equilibria in matching models with media of exchange.
Especially, the technique enables us to prove the existence of stationary equilibria in
3the case that both money and goods are perfectly divisible. It is worthwhile noting
that such existence theorems have not been known in the literature.2
In the technique, we ﬁrst consider the case of h(0) = 1, i.e., the case that no agents
have the medium of exchange. Since, at h(0) = 1, the Bellman equation is typically
quite simple, then it is easy to obtain a solution with a positive value of the medium
of exchange. As discussed in the above, there exists a stationary quasi-equilibrium for
h(0) = 1 −ε, where ε is a small positive number. Note that
 N
n=0 pnh(n)=M should
be satisﬁed in an equilibrium, where M is an exogenously given supply of the medium
of exchange. Although the stationary quasi-equilibrium with h(0) = 1 is not consistent
with the positive supply of the medium of exchange, the stationary quasi-equilibrium
with h(0) = 1 − ε is consistent with M>0. In this paper, using this technique, we
prove the existence of stationary equilibria in a new model with divisible money and
goods.3
It is worth mentioning a policy implication of our indeterminacy results. In the
literature, the welfare eﬀect of monetary policy has often been discussed in matching
models with money, and in most of these models, money is indivisible and the sta-
tionary equilibria are determinate. Thus the eﬀects of the policies are determinate as
well. However, if we assume the divisibility of money in these models, the stationary
equilibria become indeterminate. Thus it is quite diﬃcult to make accurate predictions
of the eﬀects of simple monetary policies in such models. Instead, in the accompany-
ing paper [13], we show that, for any given stationary quasi-equilibrium, there exists
tax-subsidy systems that almost lead the economy to the equilibrium and, moreover
the government can select an eﬃcient one.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we ﬁrst present our basic model and
examples. In Section 3, the key feature of stationary distributions is proved, and then in
Section 4, the real indeterminacy is informally discussed; the rigorous discussion and the
proofs are given in Appendix A. Some models with a continuum of stationary equilibria
are also given. Moreover, we present a suﬃcient condition that the indeterminacy of
stationary quasi-equilibria implies that of stationary equilibria, and discuss the case of
indivisible money. In Section 5, we present our general technique to prove the existence
of equilibria and then prove the existence of equilibria in a new model with perfectly
2Shi [18] presented a model with divisible money and goods. However, each agent consists of a continuum of members
and, because of the average eﬀect, the state of each agent is always the same in the steady state. In other words, there
is just one state in the equilibrium and thus the concept of a stationary distribution is meaningless in the model.
3Also, Kamiya et al. [12] shows a suﬃcient condition for the existence of single-price equilibria with an arbitrary
upper bound of money holdings in Zhou [21] model by using this technique.
4divisible money and goods. In Section 6, we relax some assumptions given in Section 2;
such as possibility of multiple media of exchange, possibility of the matchings not being
pairwise, possibility of holding medium of exchange gives some utility, and possibility
of discarding the upper bound of holdings of media of exchange.
2 The Basic Model and Examples
In this section, we present the basic model. Since our concern is mainly on the station-
arity of holdings of medium of exchange, the other aspects of the model are described in
a quite general way. For concrete examples of the basic model, see Zhou [21]’s model in
Section 2.2 and a divisible money version of Camera and Corbae [3]’s model in Section
2.3.
2.1 The Basic Model
We make the following assumptions in most parts of this paper for simplicity: there is
only one medium of exchange, the matching is pairwise, holdings of media of exchange
give no utility, and there is an upper bound of holdings of the medium of exchange.
All of these assumptions will be relaxed in Section 6.
Throughout this paper, we assume that there are inﬁnitely lived agents with a
nonatomic mass of measure one. Our model can be considered both as a continuous-
time model and as a discrete-time model depending on the interpretations of the match-
ing technology presented below. There is one medium of exchange which is perfectly
durable and divisible. Here, the medium of exchange is for example ﬁat money. Al-
though the medium of exchange is traded for perishable goods, we do not explicitly
specify them; all the results in what follows can be obtained no matter what the spec-
iﬁcation is.
We conﬁne our attention to stationary equilibria in which, for some positive number
p, all trades occur with its integer multiple amounts of the medium of exchange.4 In
what follows, we focus on stationary distributions on {0,...,N} expressed by h =
(h(0),...,h(N)), where h(n) is a measure of the set of agents with np amount of
the medium of exchange, and the upper bound N<∞ can be either exogenous or
endogenous. Of course, h(n) ≥ 0 and
 N
n=0 h(n) = 1 hold. Let M>0 be a given supply
of the medium of exchange. Since p is uniquely determined by
 N
n=0 pnh(n)=M for a
4Note that we do not exclude the case in which one good is traded for multiple prices, i.e., the case of price dispersion.
5given h (unless h(0) = 1), then, deleting p from {0,p,2p,...,Np}, the set {0,...,N}
can be considered as the state space.
An agent with n chooses an action in An = {a1,...,a kn}. Note that we restrict
our attention to a ﬁnite action space. Let βnj ≥ 0 be the proportion of the agents
choosing an action aj among the agents with n, and β =( β01,...,β nj,...,β NkN).
Thus
 kn
j=1βnj = 1 holds. Deﬁne h(n,j)a sh(n,j)=βnjh(n). Let γ ∈ RL be the
parameter of the model.
The technology of pairwise matching is described by random matching process and
the following function f. When an agent with (n,j) meets an agent with (n ,j ), the
former’s and the latter’s states will be n + f((n,j),(n ,j )) and n  − f((n,j),(n ,j )),
respectively.5 That is f maps an ordered pair ((n,j),(n ,j )) to a non-negative integer
f((n,j),(n ,j )). Here “ordered” means, for example, that the former is a seller and
the latter is a buyer. When N is exogenously determined, we assume
N ≥ n + f((n,j),(n
 ,j
 )) and n
  − f((n,j),(n
 ,j
 )) ≥ 0.
When N is endogenously determined, we assume the latter condition while the former
one should be satisﬁed on the equilibrium path.
By random matching process, the rate of matching between agents with (n,j) and
(n ,j ) is written as αh(n,j)h(n ,j ) for some α>0. Note that α is a parameter and is
included in γ. Needless to say, in discrete time cases, the proportion αh(n,j)h(n ,j )o f
agents move from n to n+f((n,j),(n ,j ) and n  to n −f((n,j),(n ,j )) in each period.
In continuous time cases, αh(n,j)h(n ,j ) is the time derivative of the proportion of
such movements.
We adopt a Bellman equation approach. Let V (n) be the value of state n, n =
0,...,N. The variables in the model are denoted by x =( V,h,β). Let Wnj(x,γ)b e
the value of action j at state n. Thus, in equilibria, Wnj(x,γ)=V (n) holds for j such
that βnj > 0. Note that Wnj(x,γ) includes the utility and/or the production cost of
perishable goods.
Remark 1 One may think that our model is too restrictive in two points: conﬁning our
attention to stationary equilibria in which all trades occur with some integer multiple
of p and to a ﬁnite action space. Moreover, some might think that such an equilibrium
does not exist in Camera and Corbae [3]’s model or in Trejos and Wright [19]’s model if
5In this formulation it is implicitly assumed that the bargaining immediately ends on the equilibrium path. However,
it is not a substantial drawback of our model, because we could analyze a situation in which the bargaining delays by
extending the state space.
6money is divisible. However, we will later show that it really exists. Also, as for ﬁnite
action space, we will later show that many matching models with divisible money can
be converted into the models with ﬁnite action spaces. More speciﬁcally, see Section
2.2 and 4.1 for Zhou [21]’s model, and see Section 2.3 and 4.2 for the divisible money
version of Camera and Corbae [3]’s model. For Trejos and Wright [19]’s model and a
general discussion, see Section 4.4.
Remark 2 The rate of matching can be much more general. That is even if it is some
function of (n,j),(n ,j ),h,and β, the arguments in what follows do not change. The
general model, for example, includes so-called “directed search” models such as Matsui
and Shimizu [15].
Remark 3 It is worthwhile noting that, in the case of time-additive expected utility
in discrete time, Wnj can be for example written as:
Wnj(x,γ)=U(h,β,j,γ)+κE(V (n
 )|h,β,j,n),
where κ is a discount factor, U is the temporal utility, and E(V (n )|h,β,j,n) is the
expectation of V (n ) conditional on h,β,j,n. We can also analyze the case that U
depends on the amount of money. For the details, see Section 6.
Remark 4 We can easily extend our model to the case that prices are not neces-







2)p}, and p and
√
2p are the equilibrium
prices. Then we can obtain the same results as in the case of nonnegative integer
multiples of p. In fact, our argument is applicable to any ﬁnite state space.
Remark 5 Our model includes the case that both barter and monetary exchange are
possible, such as Shi [17]. It is worthwhile noting that, as far as some monetary
exchange exists in equilibria, our argument in the following sections are applicable.
2.2 Zhou Model
In Zhou [21], time is continuous, and pairwise random matchings take place according
to Poisson process with a parameter µ. There are k types of agents with equal fractions
and the same number of types of goods. Only one unit of good i can be produced and
held by a type i − 1 (mod k) agent. The production cost is c.At y p ei agent obtains
utility u>0 only when she consumes one unit of good i. Fiat money is divisible and
7there is no inventory constraint on ﬁat money. For every matched pair, the seller posts
a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer, ignorant of the buyer’s money holdings.
Zhou shows the existence of “single price equilibria” in which all trades occur with
a price p∗. In the equilibria, the support of money holdings distribution is endoge-
nously bounded. Let the support be {0,p ∗,2p∗,...,Np ∗}, where N is endogenously
determined. Note that, as long as symmetric Markov equilibria concerned, the value
function depends only upon current money holdings. It is veriﬁed that this type of
equilibria is included in our model as follows:
• h(n) is the fraction of agents with np∗ amount of ﬁat money.
• An = {aj}j∈Kn, where Kn = {(o,r)|o =0 ,1,..., ˆ N,r =0 ,1,...,n} for some
ﬁnite ˆ N, i.e., kn =# Kn (here, we have slightly abused the notations; j denotes
an action instead of an integer). An action aj = a(o,r) means that an agent oﬀers
op∗ when she is a seller, and she accepts the partner’s oﬀer if and only if the oﬀer
price is less than or equal to rp∗ when she is a buyer.
• f ((n,j),(n ,j )) is the monetary transfer between a seller (n,j) and a buyer






o if o ≤ r 
0 otherwise.
• The time derivative of the matching between a seller (n,j) and a buyer (n ,j )i s
(µ/k)h(n,j)h(n ,j ).
• V (n) is the value of np∗.
In order to discuss stationary equilibrium, we also need to consider actions excluded
from our action space, and the strategy and the value at η/ ∈{ 0,p ∗,...,Np ∗}.I n
Section 4.1, we will show that the above speciﬁcations are suﬃcient.
2.3 Divisible Money Version of Camera and Corbae Model
Camera and Corbae [3] (referred to below as CC) analyze a model in which ﬁat money
is indivisible, there is an exogenously given upper bound of money holdings, and goods
are perfectly divisible. In this subsection, we extend the model to the case of perfectly
divisible ﬁat money. Later we show that there is a continuum of stationary equilibria
of which strategies are similar to the strategy in CC.
8CC’s model is similar to Zhou’s. The diﬀerences are the divisibility of goods, the
bargaining procedure, and the speciﬁcations of ﬁat money. By consuming q unit of
goods, an agent obtains utility U (q)=q1−λ/(1 − λ), where λ ∈ (0,1) is a parameter.
The cost function is C(q)=q. After observing the seller’s money holdings, the buyer
posts a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (d,q), where d and q are quantities of money and goods,
respectively.
In the original version of CC model, one unit is no longer divisible. Agents are under
a money holding constraint; N is the maximum unit they can hold. Let MS be the
total units of money supply. Note that N and MS are exogenously given in CC.
Let us turn to the case of divisible money. For a given p∗ > 0, we will later analyze
an equilibrium in which all trades occur with p∗ amount of ﬁat money. Agents behave
as if p∗ were the minimum unit of divisibility. Let ¯ N and M be the upper bound of
money holdings and the total quantity of ﬁat money, respectively. Then let
N =





where  x  denotes the integer part of x, then the divisible money version looks similar
to the original version. The only diﬀerence is that N and MS are endogenously given
in the divisible version.
One might think that the divisible money version of CC model is not a special case of
our model, since the action space includes the choice of quantity oﬀer in R+. However,
since a buyer can exploit all gains from trade, then the equilibrium quantity is uniquely
determined as the function of the oﬀer price, the partner’s money holdings, and the
value function. Thus we can conﬁne our attention to a simpler action space as in CC.
Now, we can check that our model includes that of the divisible money version of CC
model as follows:
• h(n) is the measure of the set of agents with np∗ amount of ﬁat money.
• An = {aj}j∈Kn, where Kn = {(o0,o 1,...,o N) | oˆ n =0 ,...,max{n,N − ˆ n}, ˆ n =
0,...,N}, i.e., kn =# Kn (here, we have slightly abused the notations; j denotes
an action instead of an integer). An action aj = a(o0,...,oN) means that the agent
oﬀers oˆ np∗ amount of money when she is a buyer and the partner’s money holdings
are ˆ np∗. Note that the set of a seller’s actions is a singleton, since all of his gain
from trade is extracted on the equilibrium path.
• f ((n,(o0,...,o N)),(n ,(o 
0,...,o  
N))) = on .
9• The time derivative of the matching between a seller (n,j) and a buyer (n ,j )i s
(µ/k)h(n,j)h(n ,j ).
• V (n) is the value of np∗.
Similarly as in Zhou model, although we also need to consider actions excluded from
our action space, and the strategy and the value at η/ ∈{ 0,p ∗,...,Np ∗}, we will show
that the above speciﬁcations are suﬃcient. For the details, see Section 4.2.
3 Stationarity
By the deﬁnition of f, the outﬂow On and the inﬂow In at state n, functions of h, β,


























 ) | i + f((i,j),(i
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 ) | i
  − f((i,j),(i
 ,j
 )) = n}.
The condition for stationarity is On = In,n=0 ,...,N,and
 N
n=0 h(n) = 1. In fact,
On (In) is the “gross” outﬂow (inﬂow resp.), since it includes the fraction of agents
who are matched with others but make no trade using the medium of exchange, i.e.,
the case of f((i,j),(i ,j )) = 0, where i = n or i  = n. Since such fractions are included
both in On and in In, then they are clearly canceled out. Thus even if we replace them
with the “net” outﬂow and inﬂow, the results in what follows do not change.
Clearly,
 N
n=0(On − In) = 0 holds and thus at least one equation is redundant. At
ﬁrst glance, both the numbers of linearly independent equations and of variables seem









(Note that the terms O0 and I0 are multiplied by 0.)
10Proof: Consider a pair of pairs (n,j) and (n ,j ). By the matchings between them,
the proportion αh(n,j)h(n ,j ) of agents move from n to n+f((n,j),(n ,j )), and the
same proportion of agents move from n  to n  −f((n,j),(n ,j )). Corresponding to the
moves, the following terms appear in the RHS and in the LHS of (1):
the LHS the RHS
nαh(n,j)h(n ,j )( n + f((n,j),(n ,j )))αh(n,j)h(n ,j )
n αh(n,j)h(n ,j )( n  − f((n,j),(n ,j )))αh(n,j)h(n ,j )
Clearly, the sum of the terms in the LHS is equal to that in the RHS. Since this holds
for any pair of pairs (n,j) and (n ,j ), (1) holds.
The interpretation of the theorem is simple. The LHS of (1) is the total amount of
money held by the agents involved in trading before the trade, while the RHS of (1) is
the total amount of money held by them after the trade. Clearly, they must coincide.
Note that (1) holds even in non-stationary and/or non-equilibrium situations.











holds, i.e., On − In,n =1 ,...,N, are linearly dependent. By
 N
n=0(On − In)=0 ,
without loss of generality, we can ﬁrst delete O0 − I0 = 0 and then, by the above
theorem, can delete O1 − I1 = 0. Thus the distribution is stationary if and only if
On − In =0 ,n =2 ,...,N,and
 N
n=0 h(n) − 1 = 0 hold. That is, for a given β, the
number of linearly independent equations is less than that of variables. Namely, the
condition for stationarity has at least one degree of freedom. In the next section, it is
shown that this is the main cause of the real indeterminacy.
4 Real Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria
In this section, we show that Theorem 1 implies the real indeterminacy of stationary
equilibria. First, without using Theorem 1, we directly show that there exits a con-
tinuum of stationary equilibria in Zhou [21]’s model and the divisible money version
of Camera and Corbae [3]’s model. Next, using Theorem 1, we present a general the-
ory of the real indeterminacy. More precisely, we deﬁne a stationary quasi-equilibrium
which is easy to deal with and show its real indeterminacy. Then we present a suf-
ﬁcient condition that a stationary quasi-equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium. The
11rigorous discussion about real indeterminacy, based on diﬀerential topology, is given in
Appendix A. Moreover, the case of indivisible money is discussed.
4.1 Zhou Model
Zhou [21] shows the existence of “single price equilibria” having the following feature:
the stationary distribution has masses only at 0 and p∗, i.e., the endogenously de-
termined upper bound of money holdings N is 1, sellers without money always oﬀer
p∗, sellers with p∗ always oﬀer ∞, and thus trades occur only between sellers without
money and buyers with p∗.
In order to show that this can happen as an equilibrium phenomenon, we ﬁrst
convert Zhou model into our framework as in Section 2.2. In this type of the equilibria,
sellers with p∗ cannot sell their production goods on the equilibrium path, since there
are no agents who aﬀord to accept their oﬀers. Then, even if we modify the equilibrium
strategy such that agents with p∗ oﬀer ˆ Np∗, where ˆ N ≥ 2, the value on the equilibrium
path does not change.
Since N = 1 is endogenously determined, we should check incentives at np∗,n≥ 2.
As is the case of agents with p∗, we consider equilibrium strategy such that agents
with np∗ (n ≥ 2) oﬀer ˆ Np∗, where ˆ N ≥ 2. Thus this type of the equilibrium can be











1i f j =(ˆ N,1)
0 otherwise
for n ≥ 1.








[V (n)+( 1− h(1))(u + V (n − 1)) + h(1)V (n)],n ≥ 1.







[(1 − m)u + mc],
where A = 1−m
φ+1−m.
If an agent without money oﬀers a price larger than p∗, she cannot trade. Thus she








Next, we check an incentive for agents with p∗ to oﬀer ˆ Np∗, where ˆ N ≥ 2. This is
equivalent to the condition that oﬀering p∗ makes a loss, i.e., V (2) − c ≤ V (1). This











< (1 + φ)
2 (2)
holds, then, for any suﬃciently small m, any agent with np∗ has no incentive to deviate
by an action included in An.
Based on this result, we extend the distribution, the value, and the strategy to state
space [0,∞). More precisely, deﬁne the distribution ˜ h as a natural extension of h.
Next, deﬁne the value function on [0,∞) such that ˜ V (η)=V ( η/p∗ ). Lastly, deﬁne
the equilibrium strategy as follows: (i) when a seller’s money holding is less than 2p∗,
then she oﬀers p∗, (ii) otherwise she oﬀers ˆ Np∗, where ˆ N is deﬁned as the above, (iii)
when a buyer’s money holding is less than p∗, then he always rejects the seller’s oﬀer,
and (iv) otherwise he has some reservation price larger than or equal to p∗.6
Let us consider a suﬃcient condition that the proﬁle above indeed forms a stationary
equilibrium. First, it is clear that ˜ h is a stationary distribution. Of course, p∗ is
determined by p∗˜ h(p∗)=p∗m = M. Note that p∗ >Mholds. Next, it is easily
veriﬁed that ˜ V is consistent with the equilibrium strategy. Lastly, we need to consider
a condition that an agent has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
However, we can show that (2) is suﬃcient. For, since ˜ V is a step function with the
steps of length p∗, a seller has no strict incentive to oﬀer a price other than an integer
multiple of p∗.
In summary, if (2) holds, then, for any suﬃciently small m>0, there is no incentive
to deviate from the actions speciﬁed above. It follows that there is a continuum of
stationary equilibria with diﬀerent m. Note that p∗ should also be diﬀerent in equilibria,
since p∗m = M.
6Strictly speaking, the strategy that (iv) speciﬁes at η  = p∗ is not a direct extension of β∗. But, this makes no
problem, since no price other than p∗ is ever oﬀered on the equilibrium path.
13Remark 6 It may seem strange that our condition is diﬀerent from that in Corollary
2.1 in Zhou [21]. The diﬀerence arises from the fact that we modify the equilibrium
strategy and thus the “weak undominatedness” in Zhou [21] is not necessarily satisﬁed.
Consider the case that parameters satisfy only our condition. If there were agents who
accept the oﬀer, then there should be some oﬀer prices more proﬁtable than ∞; that
is, the oﬀer ∞ is weakly dominated. However, there do not exist such agents on the
equilibrium path. Therefore the oﬀer price ∞ can also be an equilibrium oﬀer.
4.2 Divisible Money Version of Camera and Corbae Model
Some might think that the real indeterminacy result in Zhou [21] crucially depends
upon the assumptions held in the model: money holdings of a matched partner are
unobservable and a bargaining proceeds in a way like double auction. We try to refute
this. For this purpose, we show that there is also a continuum of stationary equilibria
in the divisible money version of CC model. Recall that CC assume that the money
holding of a partner is observable and a bargaining proceeds by buyer’s take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer. It suggests that the real indeterminacy is independent of the informational
setting and the bargaining procedure assumed in Zhou [21].
Let us start with considering the original version of CC in which ﬁat money is
indivisible. CC show that there exists a stationary equilibrium in which all trades
occur with one unit of ﬁat money in some region of parameters. More precisely, they
construct the strategy in which buyers with positive money holdings always oﬀer one
unit of ﬁat money and the quantity of goods such that the seller is indiﬀerent between
accept and reject. Let φ = kr/µ.7 Then their result (Proposition 2, [3]) is as follows:
Proposition 1 Suppose that ﬁat money is indivisible. There exists Φ(λ,N,MS) > 0
such that, for any N ≥ 1, any MS,a n yλ>1−(1/(N −1)), and any φ<Φ(λ,N,MS),
the strategy stated above, together with some distribution of money holdings, forms a
stationary equilibrium.
Let us turn to the case of divisible money. Recall that ¯ N is the upper bound of
money holdings. Then, by Proposition 1, we can construct the stationary equilibrium
in which all agents behave as if p∗ were the minimum unit for any p∗ ∈ (0, ¯ N].
Consider the discrete distribution with masses only at η =0 ,p ∗,2p∗,...,
  ¯ N/p∗ 
p∗,
which is a natural extension of the distribution in Proposition 1. Deﬁne the equilibrium
7Then φ in this paper is the reciprocal of φ in CC [3].
14strategy as follows: (i) when a seller has an integer multiple of p∗, then the partner oﬀers
p∗ quantity of money and the corresponding quantity of goods if his money holding is
more than or equal to p∗, and he does not trade if his money holding is less than p∗,
and (ii) the other cases, which happen with probability zero, are given below.
Below, we present conditions for the above proﬁle of distribution and strategy to
form a stationary equilibrium. Clearly, the distribution is stationary. Similarly, the
incentive compatibility conditions for deviating from oﬀering p∗ to another integer
multiple of p∗ are equivalent to those of the case of indivisible money. Below, we check
the other conditions, i.e., the incentive compatibility conditions for deviating to oﬀering
non-integer multiple of p∗
First of all, by the above distribution and strategy, the (candidate for) value function
deﬁned on [0, ¯ N], denoted by ˜ V , must be a step function with the steps of length p∗.8
Next, check the incentive of buyers. First, consider the case that a seller’s money
holding is an integer multiple of p∗. Let η (possibly non-integer multiple of p∗) be the
buyer’s money holdings, η  be the quantity of money she oﬀers, and np∗ be the seller’s
money holdings. Let q(np∗,η ) be the quantity of goods which the seller is indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting, then
q(np∗,η ) = ˜ V (np
∗ + η
 ) − ˜ V (np
∗).
Next, let n  =  η /p∗ , then
˜ V (np
∗ + η
 )=˜ V ((n + n
 )p
∗),
since ˜ V is a step function with the steps of length p∗.T h u sq(np∗,η ) = q(np∗,n p∗). That is
oﬀering n p∗ is not less proﬁtable than oﬀering η . Thus it suﬃces to check the incentive
compatibility conditions only for oﬀering some integer multiple of p∗. Next, consider
the case that a seller’s money holding is not an integer multiple of p∗. In this case,
choose any buyer’s strategy which exploits all gains from trade. Note that this behavior
does not aﬀect the value of buyers since the above matching occurs with probability
zero.
Also, given the strategy deﬁned above, the seller’s value after trade is always the
same as the one before trade.
Thus the Bellman equation at η is the same as the one at  η/p∗ . Thus the Bellman
equation is satisﬁed for all η ∈ [0, ¯ N].
8In this paper, a value function deﬁned on a certain interval in R is denoted by ˜ V whereas the one deﬁned on
{0,1,...,N} is denoted by V .
15For an intuitive illustration of the arguments, consider a buyer with money holding
of 1.5p∗. One might think that she has a strict incentive to oﬀer .5p∗ instead of p∗.
However, the money holdings of her future partners will be some integer multiple of p∗
with probability 1, so that she does not appreciate smaller portion of money than p∗.
Thus the quantity in compensation for .5p∗ is the same as for 0, i.e., q(np∗,.5p∗) = q(np∗,0p∗).
Thus we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that ﬁat money is perfectly divisible. Then for p∗ ∈ (0, ¯ N],
any M,a n yλ>1 − (1/(  ¯ N/p ∗ −1)), and any φ<Φ(λ,  ¯ N/p ∗ ,M/p ∗) where Φ
appears in Proposition 1, the proﬁle of distribution and strategy stated above forms a
stationary equilibrium.
Since p∗ is an endogenous variable in the divisible money model, there is a continuum
of stationary equilibria with diﬀerent p∗.
4.3 General Theory of the Real Indeterminacy
In this subsection, we present an informal discussion of the general theory of the real
indeterminacy by using Theorem 1. See Appendix A for the detailed presentation.
First, we present the deﬁnition of a stationary quasi-equilibrium.





+ is said to be a









∗(n) − 1=0 , (4)
V
∗(n) − Wnj(x
∗,γ)=0 i f β
∗





nj − 1=0 ,n =0 ,...,N, (6)
V
∗(n) − Wnj(x
∗,γ) ≥ 0i f β
∗
nj =0 . (7)
Recall that α is included in γ.
Note that we do not require (3) for n =0 ,1; it suﬃces to deﬁne a stationary
distribution due to Theorem 1. We call x∗ a “quasi-equilibrium” because we need
some additional conditions in order for x∗ to be a real stationary equilibrium: (i) the
16existence of p>0 satisfying
 N
n=0pnh(n)=M, which is equivalent to the condition
h(0) < 1, (ii) the incentive not to choose an action out of our action space, and (iii) the
existence of strategies at state η/ ∈{ 0,p,...,Np} consistent with the given stationary
quasi-equilibrium. For the details, see Section 4.4.
Remark 7 In order for V ∗ to optimize the real objective function, the transversality
condition in dynamic programming should be satisﬁed. In the case of time additive
expected utility with a discount factor κ ∈ (0,1), it is clearly satisﬁed.
First, we ﬁx the set of equilibrium actions,9 denoted by b, i.e., b is a set of (n,j),
and we conﬁne the domain of β to
Ω
b = {(βnj)(n,j)∈b | βnj > 0 for (n,j) ∈ b}. (8)
In the previous section, we showed that two of On(h,β,α) − In(h,β,α),n=0 ,...,N,
are redundant. Thus, for given b and β, h is determined up to at least one degree of
freedom. Suppose, for a given stationary quasi-equilibrium (V ∗,h ∗,β∗), (7) is satisﬁed
with strict inequality for all (n,j) such that βnj = 0. Then all stationary quasi-
equilibria in a small neighborhood of (V ∗,h ∗,β∗) are determined by (3)-(6), and, by
the above argument on stationary distributions, the number of equations and variables
are 2N+#b+1 and 2N+#b+2, respectively. Thus the set of equilibria is generically at
least one-dimensional. This means that the main cause of indeterminacy is the feature
of stationary distributions shown in Theorem 1.




∗,γ) ≥ 0 for (n,j) / ∈ b
∗ (9)
holds. Suppose in (9) all of inequalities are strict. Then, besides degenerate cases, it
follows from the implicit function theorem that the dimension of the set of stationary
quasi-equilibria around (V ∗,h ∗,β∗) is at least one. Of course, V ∗(n)=Wnj(x∗,γ)m a y
hold for some (n,j) / ∈ b∗. However, under mild conditions, we can show that generically
only one of inequalities in (9) can be equal. If there is just one equality in (9), then it is
on the boundary of a connected set of stationary quasi-equilibria of which dimension is
more than or equal to one. Thus the dimension of the set of stationary quasi-equilibria
is generically more than or equal to one.
9Without ﬁxing equilibrium actions, we can formulate the problem as a kind of nonlinear complementarity problems.
However, the special structure of the problem prevents us to use the standard technique. That is, without ﬁxing it, the
dimension of equilibria may not be determinate. (See Appendix A.)
17The rigorous discussions of the above and several indeterminacy theorems will be
given in Appendix A. Below, we only present the most important theorems. For a
given γ, let Eb∗
γ be the set of stationary quasi-equilibria such that βnj can be positive
only if (n,j) ∈ b∗. Let gb∗
be the function expressed by the LHS of (3)-(6) and (9)
replacing “if β∗
nj > 0” in (5) by “if βnj ∈ b∗”. Let Cb∗
, Cb∗(n,j), and Cb∗(n,j)(n ,j ) be the
subsets in the ﬁnal set10 corresponding to the set of stationary quasi-equilibria in which
all inequalities in (9) are strict, only the (n,j)th one is equal, and only the (n,j)th and
the (n ,j )th ones are equal, respectively. (For the precise deﬁnitions, see Appendix A.)
Theorem 2 Let Γ ⊂ RL be a C2 manifold without boundary.11 For a given b∗, suppose
that Eb∗
γ  = ∅ holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that gb∗
is C2 and is transversal to Cb∗
, Cb∗(n,j),
and Cb∗(n,j)(n ,j ) for all (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b∗. Then, for almost every γ ∈ Γ, Eb∗
γ is a
one-dimensional manifold with boundary. Moreover, at any endpoint of the manifold,
only one V ∗(n) − Wnj(x∗,γ) ≥ 0,(n,j) / ∈ b∗, can be binding.
For simplicity, we assume that Γ is an open set in RL. For example, “gb∗
is transversal
to Cb∗
” means if gb∗
(ˆ x, ˆ γ) ∈ Cb∗
holds for some (ˆ x, ˆ γ), then, together with the tangent
space of Cb∗ at gb∗(ˆ x, ˆ γ), the space {Dgb∗
(ˆ x,ˆ γ)(xT,γ)T | (x,γ) is in the domain} spans the
ﬁnal set,12 where Dgb∗
(ˆ x,ˆ γ) is the Jacobian matrix at (ˆ x, ˆ γ) and T denotes transpose. As
shown in the examples in the following subsection and Section 5, the conditions in the
theorem are quite mild and can often be easily veriﬁed at least locally. Note that, by
verifying the condition locally, we can show that there is a continuum of equilibria.
We should verify the condition globally in order to ﬁnd some features of the set of
equilibria. Using the features, we can numerically compute a connected component of
equilibria. (See Remark 8 in Section 5.)
Although we have shown that there is a kind of indeterminacy, it might not be a
real one. That is, in a connected component of the set of equilibria, the real variables
h and V might be the same. For real indeterminacy, it suﬃces to show that the welfare
 N
n=0 h(n)V (n) can be the same only in a set of measure zero in the set of stationary
quasi-equilibria. To see this, for a given b∗, we analyze
 N
n=0 h(n)V (n)=a together
with (3)-(6) and (9) replacing “if β∗
nj > 0” in (5) by “if βnj ∈ b∗”. Fix a ∈ R. Then the
numbers of equations and variables are the same and thus the dimension of the set of
10For a function F : X → Y , X, Y , and {y ∈ Y |∃x ∈ X,F(x)=y} are called the domain, the ﬁnal set, and the range,
respectively.
11Γ can be considered as the set of γ such that some strategies using actions in b∗ can be a stationary quasi-equilibrium.
12In general, the tangent space at gb∗
(ˆ x, ˆ γ) should be spanned.
18stationary quasi-equilibria with welfare a is generically one dimension less than that of
the set of stationary quasi-equilibrium. The theorem can be stated as follows. First,
we modify gb∗
, denoted by gb∗
w , adding one equation
 N
n=0 h(n)V (n) − a = 0 and one
variable a ∈ R. We should also modify Cb∗




a , and C
b∗(n,j)(n ,j )
a , respectively; for example, Cb∗
a is the subsets in the ﬁnal set
corresponding to the cases that all inequalities in (9) are strict and the welfare is a.
Theorem 3 Let Γ ⊂ RL be a manifold without boundary. For b∗, suppose that Eb∗
γ  = ∅
holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that, for any given a, gb∗




a , and C
b∗(n,j)(n ,j )




n=0 h(n)V (n)=a} is a zero-dimensional manifold.
4.4 Stationary Quasi-Equilibrium and Stationary Equilibrium
In the previous subsection, we focused on stationary quasi-equilibria instead of sta-
tionary equilibria, because the former is easier to deal with than the latter. In this
subsection, we discuss a suﬃcient condition that the indeterminacy of stationary quasi-
equilibria implies that of stationary equilibria. In general, the following three conditions
are suﬃcient; (i) the existence of p>0 such that
 N
n=0pnh(n)=M, i.e., h(0) < 1, (ii)
the incentive not to choose an action out of our action space, and (iii) the existence
of strategies at state η/ ∈{ 0,p,...,Np} consistent with the given stationary quasi-
equilibrium. (i) can be easily checked. We need to check (ii) and (iii) carefully. One
might think that an agent, for example, has strict incentive to oﬀer .5p, since she may
obtain (pay) .5p later. However, under some reasonable assumptions, this is not true,
because such a trade cannot occur later on the equilibrium path. Below, we discuss
this point rigorously.
We focus on economies in which each matched agents observe the partners’ money
holdings. We consider a model with the state space [0, ¯ N] for some positive real number
¯ N, the set of money holdings, and the action space ˜ A =Π η∈[0, ¯ N] ˜ Aη, where each element
in ˜ Aη is represented by a ﬁnite dimensional vector of amounts of money r =( ri)
transferred along with trade13 and the other factor t ∈ T related to the bargaining,
where T is a ﬁnite set.14 In other words, we focus on the case that the other factors in
trade, e.g., the amount of goods, can be considered to be determined by (r,t) and V .
(See examples below.) We ﬁrst suppose that
13For example, r =( r1,r 2) is the amounts of money oﬀer when an agent is a seller and when she is a buyer.
14For example, T includes “replies” such as “accept” or “reject”.
19(∗) (a) a bargaining game between a matched pair15 has a pure strategy
Markov perfect equilibrium, and (b) the bargaining game immediately ends
on the equilibrium path.
For a matched pair, let Vs0 = V (ηs) and Vb0 = V (ηb) be the seller’s and the buyer’s
values of their money holdings, respectively, and F ⊂ R2 be the feasible set of values
of their money holdings after trade. We further suppose that
(∗∗) (a) F does not directly depend on r but on (V (ηs+ri),V(ηb−ri)), where
(r,t)=( ( ri),t)i si n ˜ Aηs or in ˜ Aηb for some t ∈ T, 16 and (b) an outcome of
bargaining game (Vs1, Vb1,y), where (Vs1, Vb1) are the values of the seller’s and
buyer’s money holdings after trade, and y is a vector of the other elements of
outcome,17 depends only on (Vs0, Vb0,F).
By (∗), the bargaining game has an outcome, and thus (∗∗)(b) has meaning.
For a given N, we focus on a set of p>0 such that N =  
¯ N
p  . We restrict our
attention to the state space {0,1,...,N} and the action space ΠN
n=0An, where An is a
ﬁnite set such that, for each p>0, each element a ∈ An corresponds to (r,t) ∈ ˜ Anp
and all elements of r are integer multiples of p. For example, a =( n1,n 2) corresponds
to r =( n1p,n2p), where n1p and n2p are the amounts of money oﬀer when an agent
is a seller and when she is a buyer, respectively. Then a stationary quasi-equilibrium
(V ∗,h ∗,β∗) with p∗ = M
￿
n nh∗(n) is deﬁned. Below, we show that it corresponds to
a stationary equilibrium if h∗(0) < 1. More precisely, deﬁne (˜ V ∗,˜ h∗,(˜ β∗
np∗)N
n=0)a s





, ˜ h∗ is the natural extension of h∗ to [0, ¯ N], and ˜ β∗
np∗ is naturally
deﬁned from β∗
n. Then it will be shown that (˜ V ∗,˜ h∗,(˜ β∗
np∗)N
n=0) satisﬁes the following
two conditions: (ii’) each agent at np∗ has no strict incentive to choose actions out
of the support of ˜ β∗
np, and (iii’) for each η ∈ [0, ¯ N], which is not an integer multiple
of p∗, there exists some (˜ β∗
η) consistent with ˜ V ∗. Note that (ii’), (iii’) corresponds to
(ii), (iii) stated above, respectively. Thus, (ii’) and (iii’) imply that (˜ V ∗,˜ h∗, ˜ β∗) forms
a stationary equilibrium.
First, since ˜ V ∗ is a step function with the steps of length p∗, we obtain the same
feasible set as V ∗ and thus, by the assumption (∗∗), (ii’) is satisﬁed.
15Here a bargaining game between a matched pair is deﬁned as a sequential game in which the initial node is an
instant when they are matched and every terminal node is an instant when the pair dissolves.
16F does not necessarily consist of {(V (ηs+ri),V(ηb−ri))|(r, t)=( ( ri),t)i si n ˜ Aηs or in ˜ Aηb for some t ∈ T} . That
is some element in this set might be rejected in the bargaining. (∗∗)(a) simply means that F does not directly depend
on amounts of money but on the values after trades.
17For example, y includes the amount of the commodity goods.
20Next, we check (iii’). Consider an agent with η such that η/p∗ is not an integer.
Clearly, her partner holds np∗ for some n with probability one. Since ˜ V ∗(η)=V ∗( 
η
p∗ )
and the feasible set for this pair is the same as that of the pair of agents with  
η
p∗ p∗
and np∗, and thus, by the assumption (∗∗), the outcome of the bargaining game is the
same as that of the pair of agents with  
η
p∗ p∗ and np∗, and the value of η is indeed
V ∗( 
η
p∗ ), i.e., the outcome is consistent with ˜ V ∗. For a pair of agents with η and
η  such that both η/p∗ and η /p∗ are not integers, we can choose any Markov perfect
equilibria of the bargaining game. In other words, the choice does not aﬀect the value
function since η’s partner is np∗ for some n with probability one.
It is veriﬁed that the divisible money version of Camera and Corbae’s model satisﬁes
(∗) and (∗∗) as follows. In Camera and Corbae’s model, if the seller and the buyer
have η and η , respectively, then the buyer’s oﬀer η   maximizes U(q(η,η  ))+V (η  −η  ),
where q(η,η  ) is a solution to
˜ V (η + η
  ) − q = ˜ V (η). (10)
(∗) and (∗∗) are clearly satisﬁed. Note that the amount of goods in trade is determined
by (10), i.e., it is an element of the other outcome stated in (∗∗).
Similarly, we can deal with a divisible money version of Trejos and Wright [19]’s
model. Let us extend their model to the one with divisible ﬁat money in the same way
as we did in Section 2.3, and consider the distribution and the strategy in which agents
behave as if p∗ were the minimum unit of divisibility. Then the (candidate for) value
function is a step function with the steps of length p∗. Thus, if the seller and the buyer




  − d))(−C(qd)+˜ V (η + d)), (11)




  − d))(−C(q)+˜ V (η + d)), (12)
(see Trejos and Wright [19], p. 134.), then (∗) and (∗∗) are clearly satisﬁed. In other
words, some integer multiple of p∗ is necessarily one maximizer of the above, so, if
such a distribution and a strategy form a stationary quasi-equilibrium, they are also a
stationary equilibrium.18 A similar argument applies to Shi [18].
18Consider the following equilibrium candidate: Let ¯ N be the upper bound of money holdings. Choose any p∗ such
that ¯ N/2 <p ∗ ≤ ¯ N, i.e.,   ¯ N/p∗  = 1. Let the money holdings distribution have masses only at 0 and p∗, and the
strategy specify that any agent oﬀers a money quantity p∗ (if possible). Then, it is easy to show that this proﬁle of the
distribution and the strategy form a stationary equilibrium since p∗ is necessarily a maximizer of (11).
21Although the discussion above depends upon the assumption that each matched
agent observes the partners’ money holdings, this is not a crucial assumption. For
example, Zhou’s model assumes that each matched agents cannot observe the partner’s
money holdings. It follows that a bargaining outcome depends upon a distribution of
(Vs0, Vb0,F) determined by h and β. However, this would not virtually change the
analysis above.
4.5 Indivisible Money
In the case of indivisible medium of exchange, our results suggest that the greater the
divisibility of the medium of exchange, the larger the number of equilibria. Suppose
that p should be in a ﬁnite set P = {p1,p 2,...,p L}, where p  <p  +1. For example,
p  =   dollars. Suppose p∗ in P is a solution to M =
 N
n=0 pnh∗(n), where h∗ is an
equilibrium distribution. By the above arguments, all h in a neighborhood of h∗ can
be equilibrium distributions in the perfectly divisible case. If some p¯   in P is a solution
to
 N
n=0 pnh(n)=M, where h is in the neighborhood, then h is also an equilibrium
distribution in the indivisible case. Therefore, if p +1 − p  is small, then there must be
a lot of equilibria. In other words, for a ﬁxed money supply and a ﬁxed upper bound
of money holdings, there are much larger number of equilibria in the case that one unit
of money is one cent compared with the case which the minimum unit is a hundred
dollar.
Formally, for a given b∗, we analyze
 N
n=0 nh(n)=t together with (3)-(6) and (9)
replacing “if β∗
nj > 0” in (5) by “if βnj ∈ b∗”. The theorem can be stated as follows.
First, we modify gb∗
, denoted by gb∗
d , adding one equation
 N
n=0 nh(n)−t = 0 and one
variable t ∈ R. We should also modify Cb∗




d , and C
b∗(n,j)(n ,j )
d , respectively; for example, Cb∗
d is the subsets in the ﬁnal set
corresponding to the cases that all inequalities in (9) are strict and
 N
n=0 nh(n)−t =0 .
Theorem 4 Let M and N be given and Γ ⊂ RL be a manifold without boundary. For
b∗, suppose that Eb∗
γ  = ∅ holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that gb∗




d , and C
b∗(n,j)(n ,j )
d for all (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b∗. Then, for almost every γ ∈ Γ,
and for any positive integer I, there exists a positive integer L such that the number
of stationary quasi-equilibria with
p ∈ PL = { 1 +
 2
 3
|  1 is a nonnegative integer,  2 =0 ,1,...,L,  3 =1 ,2,...,L,  2 ≤  3}
is larger than I.
22Proof: Let x∗ =( V ∗,h ∗,βb∗
) be a stationary quasi-equilibrium. Let t∗ =
 N
n=0 nh∗(n). By the assumptions and implicit function theorem, there exists an ε>0
and a function ϕ :( t∗ − ε,t∗ + ε) → Eb∗
γ . Thus for a large enough L, the number of
p ∈ PL such that M
p ∈ (t∗ − ε,t∗ + ε) is larger than I.
5 A New Technique for Proving the Existence of Stationary
Equilibrium
Our results in the previous sections enable us to prove the existence of stationary
equilibrium rather easily in some speciﬁc models. Our technique is simple but very
powerful. Indeed, we can prove the existence of stationary equilibria in some models
with divisible money and goods, although, in the literature, such existence theorems
have not been known. In Section 5.1, we discuss our technique in general and, in
Section 5.2, apply it to a new model.
5.1 The Technique
Let h(0) = 1 and h(1) = ···= h(N) = 0. Then the conditions for a stationary quasi-
equilibrium (3)-(7) become very simple in some models. Thus we may easily obtain β∗
and V ∗ satisfying V ∗(n) > 0 for some n. Moreover, as we have shown in the previous
section, there exists a stationary quasi-equilibrium even for h(0) = 1 − ε if ε>0i s
small enough.
As stated previously, three additional conditions are needed in order for (V ∗,h ∗,β∗)
to be a stationary equilibrium: (i) the existence of p>0 satisfying
 N
n=0 pnh∗(n)=M,
(ii) the incentive not to choose an action out of our action space, and (iii) the existence
of strategies at state η/ ∈{ 0,p,...,Np} consistent with the given stationary quasi-
equilibrium. Most of the cases, setting ˜ V (η)=V ( η/p ), it is rather easy to show (ii)
and (iii). On the other hand, for a given stationary quasi-equilibrium (V ∗,h ∗,β∗) such
that h∗(0) = 1, (i) is not satisﬁed, since
 N




ε) such that h∗
ε(0) = 1 − ε is consistent with (i) for some
p>0. Thus once we ﬁnd a stationary quasi-equilibrium at h(0) = 1, then we can also
ﬁnd a stationary equilibrium.
The above argument can be easily applied to models with indivisible money. As
Theorem 4, suppose L is large enough in
PL = { 1 +
 2
 3
|  1 is a nonnegative integer,  2 =0 ,1,...,L,  3 =1 ,2,...,L,  2 ≤  3}.
23Then the existence of a stationary quasi-equilibrium at h(0) = 1 implies the existence
of stationary equilibrium with p∗ ∈ PL.
5.2 Existence of Stationary Equilibria: An Example
In this subsection, the environment is the same as that of the divisible money version
of Camera and Corbae model presented in Section 2 besides:
• The utility function is U(q)=q
1
2.
• When a type i agent meets a type i + 1 agent, (i) with probability 1
2, the former
can post a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (ds,q s), a pair of an amount of ﬁat money and
a quantity of good, and (ii) with probability
1
2, the latter can post a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer (db,q b).
Below, we show that, for suﬃciently small search friction φ>0, there exists a
stationary equilibrium in which equilibrium trades occur only with ds = p and db = p.
Clearly, a seller oﬀers (p,qn
s) such that
V (n − 1) + U(q
n
s)=V (n) (13)
when she meets a partner with n, and a buyer oﬀers (p,qn
b ) such that
V (n +1 )− C(q
n
b)=V (n) (14)
when he meets a partner with n. Recall that C(q)=q.














































































24Suppose h(0) = 1 which implies h(n)=0 ,n =1 ,...,N, in an equilibrium. Then, by
the Bellman equation and (14), we obtain q0

















Next, we check the incentive at h(0) = 1. Suppose a buyer with n oﬀers (jp,q)t oa
seller with n , where (jp,q) exploits all gains from trade. Then the gain of the buyer is



















Since A<1 and limφ→0 A = limφ→0
1







holds for suﬃciently small φ. Thus, for suﬃciently small φ, the buyer does not oﬀer









holds if and only if n ≥ .5n . That is the buyer oﬀers j = 1 in this case and j =0
otherwise; more precisely, if n = .5n , the buyer is indiﬀerent between j = 0 and j =1 .
Suppose a seller with n oﬀers (ip,q) to a buyer with n , where (ip,q) exploits all
gains from trade. Then, by similar arguments as in the above, the seller does not oﬀer
i ≥ 2 for suﬃciently small φ>0. Moreover, she oﬀers i = 1 in the case of 2n  ≥ n and
i = 0 otherwise; more precisely, if 2n  = n, the seller is indiﬀerent between i = 0 and
i =1 .
Below, we show the existence of equilibria for N = 2. It is easily seen that, for
suﬃciently small φ, the buyers always strictly prefer j = 1 unless their money holdings
are 0 or the partners have 2p. Similarly, for suﬃciently small φ, the sellers always
strictly prefer i = 1 unless their money holdings are 2p or the partners have 0. By
tedious calculations, we obtain the Jacobian of (3)-(5), evaluated at h(0) = 1, with
19The other solution is q0
b = 0 and V (n)=0 ,n=0 ,...,N.
















Clearly, it is negative for all φ>0. Thus the implicit function theorem can be applied
and, for small ε>0, there exists a solution (h(1),h(2),V(0),V(1),V(2)) to the above
equations corresponding to h(0) = 1 − ε. Note that it is easily shown that h(n) >
0,n=1 ,2. Since the incentive of the strategy at h(0) = 1 is strict, then, due to the
continuity, the agents still use it even when h(0) = 1 − ε for small enough ε>0. It
can be shown that the set of equilibria with the endpoint corresponding to h(0) = 1 is
a one-dimensional manifold around h(0) = 1; for the rigorous argument, see Theorem
2. Finally, h(0) = 1 − ε is consistent with a positive money supply.
For N>2, similar arguments can be applied. However, the incentive at h(0) = 1 is
not strict in some cases. Thus we need to carefully choose strategies which the agents
prefer even for h(0) = 1 − ε.
Remark 8 In the above example, there exists a one-dimensional manifold, a set of
equilibria, with the endpoint corresponding to h(0) = 1. In this case, following the
manifold, we can ﬁnd its whole structure; especially, equilibria with h(0) not close to
one can be obtained. For the methods to follow one-dimensional manifolds, see, for
example, Allgower and Georg [2]. See also Herings, Talman and Yang [10]; they present
a method to follow a continuum of price constrained equilibria.
6 Extensions of the Basic Model
In the previous sections, we assumed that there is only one medium of exchange, the
matching is pairwise, holding the medium of exchange gives no utility, and there is an
upper bound of holdings of the medium of exchange. All of these assumptions can be
easily relaxed. However, in order to avoid complicated notations, we mainly show them
by examples.
First, we can allow for multiple media of exchange. For simplicity, we assume that
there are two media of exchange. Let the state space be {0,...,N1}×{ 0,...,N2}.
Suppose that an agent with (n1,n 2), a seller, meets an agent with (¯ n1, ¯ n2), a buyer, and
that a trade occurs. The seller pays (m1,m 2) to the buyer. Suppose, at each period,
the proportion of the above type of matching is ξ. Thus, by the trade, the agents in
20Clearly, (6) is redundant in this case.
26the match move from (n1,n 2)t o( n1+m1,n 2+m2), and (¯ n1, ¯ n2)t o( ¯ n1−m1, ¯ n2−m2),
respectively, and the proportion of each move is of course ξ. Thus the same argument















holds, where O(n1,n2) and I(n1,n2) are the outﬂow and the inﬂow at (n1,n 2), respectively.
That is, by the condition for stationarity, the stationary distribution is determined up
to at least one degree of freedom and the dimension of the set of stationary equilibria is
typically more than or equal to one. Of course, this argument can be applied to much
more general cases.
Second, matchings need not be pairwise. We consider the following model. There
are k + 1 goods, where k ≥ 4. The ﬁrst k goods are indivisible and immediately
perishable, and good i is consumed by type i agents. The remaining good is a perfectly
divisible and durable ﬁat-money object. A type i agent and a type i + 1 agent can
cooperate to produce one unit of good i + 2 (mod. 3). A type i agent consumes only
good i and derives instantaneous utility. Each agent is characterized by her type and
the amount of money she holds. Suppose there is a matching technology that always
chooses 3 agents. If their types are i, i+1, and i+2 (mod. 3), then a trade potentially
occurs. Let their money holdings be pn1,pn 2, and pn3, respectively. Suppose, by a
bargaining procedure, a trade occurs and the type i + 2 agent pays the type i agent
pmi and the type i + 1 agent pmi+1. Suppose the proportion of the above type of
matching is ξ. Thus, by the trade, the agents in the match move from ni to ni + mi,
ni+1 to ni+1 + mi+1, and ni+2 to ni+2 − mi − mi+1, respectively, and the proportion





n=0 nIn holds. That is, by the condition for stationarity,
h is determined up to at least one degree of freedom and the dimension of the set of
stationary equilibria is typically more than or equal to one. Of course, this argument
can be applied to much more general cases.
Third, as we mentioned in Section 2, we can deal with models in which holdings of




where κ is the discount factor, U is the temporal utility, and E(V (n )|h,β,n,j) is the
27expectation of V (n ) conditional on h,β,n,j. Here U depends on np, the quantity
of the medium of exchange. In this case, we cannot deal with
 N
n=0 pnh(n)=M
separately, since Wnj depends on p. However, analyzing
 N
n=0pnh(n)=M and (3)-
(7) in the deﬁnition of stationary quasi-equilibrium simultaneously, we can obtain the
same results as in Section 4. Intuitively, even in this case, the number of equations is
less than that of variables. Of course, we should notice that the suﬃcient conditions
that a stationary quasi-equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium, stated in Section 4.4,
may not be satisﬁed in some models. However, Zhou [22] shows that there also exists
a continuum of stationary equilibria in Green and Zhou model even if the holdings of
money give a dividend in the form of utility.
Finally, we discuss the case of N = ∞. In Appendix B, we show that
 ∞
n=0 n(On −
In) = 0 holds under a mild condition which is satisﬁed in Green and Zhou [6]. As in
Section 3, O0−I0 and O1−I1 are redundant in the condition of stationary distribution.
Thus, together with
 ∞
n=0 h(n) = 1, the stationary distribution could be determined
with at least one degree of freedom. Of course, this argument is very rough. For the
rigorous arguments, we should use the implicit function theorem or the transversality
theorem in inﬁnite dimensional spaces. (See, for example, Abraham and Robbin [1].)
However, it seems that the conditions for these theorems are typically satisﬁed in our
environment. Indeed, in Green and Zhou [6], the conditions are satisﬁed and the
stationary distribution has (at least) one degree of freedom.
Appendix
A Real Indeterminacy Theorems
We denote On(h,β,α) − In(h,β,α)b yDn(h,β,α). Let B be the power set of
{(n,j) | j =1 ,...,k n,n =0 ,...,N} and ˆ B be {b ∈ B |∀n,∃j,(n,j) ∈ b}. b ∈ ˆ B
can be considered as a set of actions used in an equilibrium. For a given b ∈ ˆ B, let
Ω
b = {(βnj)(n,j)∈b | βnj > 0 for (n,j) ∈ b}.
Let xb =( V,h,βb), where βb ∈ Ωb. For a given b ∈ ˆ B and all (n,j) ∈ b, W b
nj(xb,γ)
is deﬁned from Wnj(x,γ) by setting βn j  = 0 for all (n ,j ) / ∈ b. In parallel with this,
Db
n(h,βb,α) is deﬁned for n =2 ,...,N.
Below, we show that the dimension of the set of equilibria is at least one. However,
in fact, there are many types of stationary equilibria depending on which b ∈ ˆ B is
28used in equilibria. We ﬁrst consider the simplest case; namely, the case that h(n) >
0,n =0 ,...,N, hold and Db
n =0 ,n =2 ,...,N, can be linearly independent, i.e.,
∃(h,βb) such that Db
n(h,βb,α)=0 ,n=2 ,...,N,are linearly independent for any γ.21
Let K =
 N
n=0 kn. Recall that, for a given b ∈ ˆ B, the condition for a stationary




b,α)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N
N  
n=0
h(n) − 1=0 ,
V (n) − W
b
nj(x




βnj − 1=0 ,n =0 ,...,N
V (n) − W
b
nj(x
b,γ) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ b
∗.
Let gb : RN+1 × R
N+1





      
2N+#b+1
×R++ ×···×R++       
K−#b
,
and, for (n,j) / ∈ b,
C
b(n,j) = {0}×···×{0}
      
2N+#b+1
×R++ ×···×R++ ×{ 0}×R++ ×···×R++       
K−#b
,
where the last {0} corresponds to V (n) − W b
nj(xb,γ),(n,j) / ∈ b. Moreover, for
(n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b such that (n,j)  =( n ,j ),
C
b(n,j)(n ,j ) = {0}×···×{0}
      
2N+#b+1
×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R
      
K−#b
,
where the last two {0}s correspond to V (n) − W b
nj(xb,γ),(n,j) / ∈ b, and V (n) −
W b
n j (xb,γ),(n ,j ) / ∈ b, respectively. For γ, let Eb
γ be the set of stationary quasi-






















21The result would not change if this holds only for almost every γ.
29hold.
Theorem 2 Let Γ ⊂ RL be a C2 manifold without boundary. For b ∈ ˆ B, suppose
that Eb
γ  = ∅ holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that gb is C2 and is transversal to Cb, Cb(n,j),
and Cb(n,j)(n ,j ) for all (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b. Then, for almost every γ ∈ Γ, Eb
γ is a one-
dimensional manifold with boundary.
Proof: (i) By the parametric transversality theorem (see, for example, Guillemin and
Pollack ([8], Chapter 2) and Hirsch ([11], Chapter 3)), for almost every γ ∈ Γ, gb(·,γ)
is transversal to all of Cb, Cb(n,j) and Cb(n,j)(n ,j ),( n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b,. Let Γ  be the set
of such γs.
(ii) Let γ ∈ Γ . Suppose (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb(n,j)(n ,j ))  = ∅ for some (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈
b. Then it is a submanifold in the domain and the codimension of the manifold is
equal to the codimension of Cb(n,j)(n ,j ). Since codim Cb(n,j)(n ,j ) =2 N +# b +3
and the dimension of the domain of gb(·,γ)i s2 N +# b + 2, then the dimension of












(iii) Suppose (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb)  = ∅. Then it is a submanifold in the domain. Moreover,
the codimension of the manifold is equal to the codimension of Cb. (See, for example,
Guillemin and Pollack ([8], Chapter 1).) Since codim Cb =2 N +# b + 1 and the
dimension of the domain of gb(·,γ)i s2 N +# b + 2, then (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb) is a one-
dimensional manifold; more precisely, each connected component is diﬀeomorphic either
to an open interval or to a circle.
(iv) Suppose (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb(n,j))  = ∅ for some (n,j) / ∈ b. Let xb ∈
(gb(·,γ))−1(Cb(n,j)). Below, we show that xb is an endpoint of some one-dimensional
manifold in (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb), i.e., the connected component containing xb is homeo-
morphic to an interval. Let ϕb : R2N+K+1 → R2N+#b+2 be the projection map from
the range of gb to the space of elements which correspond to {0}si nCb(n,j). Then,
by the assumption, ϕb ◦ gb(·,γ) is a submersion at xb, i.e., the linear map deﬁned by
the Jacobian matrix at xb, denoted by dxb(ϕb ◦ gb(·,γ)), is surjective. Since the do-
main and the range of ϕb ◦ gb(·,γ) are the same, the inverse function theorem can be
applied. Thus there exist an open neighborhood of xb denoted by D, and an open
neighborhood of (0,...,0) ∈ R2N+#b+2, denoted by D , such that the restriction of
30ϕb ◦ gb(·,γ)t oD is a diﬀeomorphism from D to D . Since, for suﬃciently small ε>0,
D 
ε = {(0,...,0,t)|−ε<t<ε } is a subset of D , then (ϕb◦gb(·,γ))−1(D 
ε) is diﬀeomor-
phic to an open interval. Note that (ϕb◦gb(·,γ))−1({(0,...,0,t)|0 ≤ t<ε }) is a subset
of Eb
γ and diﬀeomorphic to [0,1). Since (ϕb◦gb(·,γ))−1((0,...,0, ε
2)) ∈ (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb),
it belongs to a connected component obtained in (iii). Thus the component should be
diﬀeomorphic to an open interval in (gb(·,γ))−1(Cb). Of course, one of its endpoints is
xb.
Next, we consider the case that (i) Db
n =0 ,n=2 ,...,N, are not linearly indepen-
dent for all βb and h, and/or that (ii) h(n) = 0 for some n in equilibria.
Example 1 For some b ∈ ˆ B, suppose f((n,j),(n ,j )) is equal to 0 or 2 for all (n,j)
and (n ,j ). Then if n is even (odd), then n+f((n,j),(n ,j )) and n−f((n,j),(n ,j ))
are even (odd). Thus the stationary distribution can be divided into two distribution
so that Db
n =0 ,n=0 ,...,N, has more than one degree of freedom.
Example 2 Under the assumption in Example 1, there exists a stationary distribution
such that h(n)=0 , for all n =2 m,m =1 ,2,....
We ﬁrst consider the case that, for any γ, Db
n =0 ,n =2 ,...,N, are not linearly
independent for all βb and h, and that h(n) > 0 for all n. Let M(b) be the maximal
number of (potentially) independent equations in Db
n =0 ,n=0 ,...,N. For simplicity,
we assume Db
n =0 ,n= N − M(b)+1 ,...,N, can be linearly independent. We deﬁne
gb : RN+1 × R
N+1









b,α),n = N − M(b)+1 ,...,N.
By the same argument as in Theorem 2, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Let Γ ⊂ RL be a C2−(N−1−M(b)) manifold without boundary. For b ∈ ˆ B,
suppose that Eb
γ  = ∅ holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that gb is C2−(N−1−M(b)) and is transversal
to Cb, Cb(n,j), and Cb(n,j)(n ,j ) for all (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b, where the deﬁnitions of them
should be slightly modiﬁed. Then, for almost every γ ∈ Γ, Eb
γ is a (N − M(b))-
dimensional manifold with boundary.
31We next consider the case that, for some b ∈ ˆ B and for any γ, h(n) = 0 holds for some
n in equilibria. That is we assume that there exists a set N(b) ⊂{ 0,1,...,N} such that
if the players take actions in b and h(n)=0 ,n / ∈ N(b), and h(n) > 0,n∈ N(b), hold,
then In = 0 and On = 0 hold for n/ ∈ N(b). For simplicity, we assume that #N(b) − 2
of Db
n =0 ,n ∈ N(b), can be linearly independent in equilibria. (We will discuss the
general case later.) Let N (b) be the subset of N(b) such that Db
n =0 ,n∈ N (b), can
be linearly independent. We deﬁne gb : RN+1 × R
#N(b)
++ × Ωb × RL → R#N (b) × R ×











By the same argument as in Theorem 2, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Let Γ ⊂ RL be a C2 manifold without boundary. For b ∈ ˆ B, suppose
that Eb
γ  = ∅ holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that gb is C2 and is transversal to Cb, Cb(n,j), and
Cb(n,j)(n ,j ) for all (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ b, where the deﬁnitions of them should be slightly
modiﬁed. Then, for almost every γ ∈ Γ, Eb
γ is a one-dimensional manifold with bound-
ary.
In general, #N (b) can be less than #N(b) − 2. Applying the same argument as in
Theorems 6 and 5, the dimension of the set of equilibrium for b is more than one.
In order to show real indeterminacy of equilibria, it suﬃces to prove that the welfare
 N
n=0 h(n)V (n) is not constant on each connected set of equilibria. For a given a ∈ R,




b,h,α)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N
N  
n=0
h(n) − 1=0 ,
V (n) − W
b
nj(x




βnj − 1=0 ,n =0 ,...,N
V (n) − W
b
nj(x




h(n)V (n) − a =0 .
Let gb
w : RN+1 × R
N+1
++ × Ωb × RM × R → RN−1 × R × R#b × RN+1 × RK−#b × R be






      
2N+#b+1
×R++ ×···×R++       
K−#b
×{0},




      
2N+#b+1
×R++ ×···×R++ ×{ 0}×R++ ×···×R++       
K−#b
×{0}.




      
2N+#b+1
×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R
      
K−#b
×{0}.
By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3 Let Γ ⊂ RL be a C1 manifold without boundary. For b ∈ ˆ B, suppose that
Eb
γ  = ∅ holds for all γ ∈ Γ, and that, for any given a, gb




a , and C
b(n,j)(n ,j )




n=0 h(n)V (n)=a} is a zero-dimensional manifold.
Together with Theorem 2, the above theorem implies real indeterminacy of Eb
γ. That
is, for any given welfare level a, the dimension of the set of equilibria with welfare level
33a is one dimension less than that of the set of equilibria. The same argument applies
to the cases in Theorems 5 and 6; the dimension of the set of equilibria that have the
same welfare level is one dimension less than that of the set of equilibria.
B The Case of N = ∞
Theorem 7 Suppose, for some integer δ>0, f((i,j),(i ,j )) ≤ δ holds for all (i,j)
and (i ,j ). Then
∞  
n=0
n(On − In)=0 .
Proof: It suﬃces to show that
 ∞








(Note that we can deﬁne ˆ On and ˆ In since
 ∞





ˆ On − ˆ In
 
absolutely converges.






























{j,i ,j |f((i ,j ),(i+k,j))=k}
αh(i
 ,j
 )h(i + k,j)
34hold for all i ≥ δ.T h u s
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